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Abstract 
“Informal Inference” is an approach to statistical inference based on resampling methods and 
links Bootstrap as replacement for confidence intervals and re-randomisation tests as 
alternative to statistical tests. Informal inference, on the other hand, is a conceptualisation of 
statistical inference by elementarising the full complexity by context that makes the 
interpretation of the developed concepts meaningful, or by establishing analogies and meta-
knowledge that provide insight. Firstly, we illustrate the significance test by an elementary 
rank test. Secondly, we build informal ideas about inference by an analogy to the medical 
situation. Thirdly, we highlight the potential of informal ways to statistical inference by 
examples. Fourthly, we describe the “Informal Inference” approach. Finally, we draw some 
conclusions about the didactical potential and the drawbacks of “Informal Inference”. Our 
considerations are signified by the goal of facilitating conceptual understanding. 
Keywords: Statistical inference, simulation and resampling, conceptual understanding, 
statistical thinking, elementarisation 
Resumen 
“Inferencia Informal” es un enfoque de la inferencia estadística, que se basa en métodos de 
remuestreo y se vincula a Bootstrap como sustituto de los intervalos de confianza y a las 
pruebas de aleatorización como alternativa a los contrastes estadísticos. La inferencia 
informal, por otro lado, es una conceptualización de la inferencia estadística mediante la 
simplificación de su complejidad mediante contextos que hacen que la interpretación de los 
conceptos desarrollados sea significativa, o mediante el establecimiento de analogías y 
metaconocimientos que proporcionen comprensión. Primero, ilustramos la prueba de 
significación mediante una prueba de rangos elemental. Segundo, construimos ideas 
informales sobre la inferencia, por analogía con la situación médica. En tercer lugar, 
destacamos el potencial de las aproximaciones informales a la inferencia estadística mediante 
ejemplos. En cuarto lugar, describimos el enfoque de “Inferencia Informal”. Finalmente, 
sacamos algunas conclusiones sobre el potencial didáctico y los inconvenientes de la 
“Inferencia Informal”. Nuestras consideraciones están significadas por el objetivo de facilitar 
la comprensión conceptual.  
Keywords: Inferencia estadística, simulación y remuestreo, comprensión conceptual, 
pensamiento estadístico, elementarización 
1. Introduction 
The paper has two main goals: Firstly, to illustrate ways of elementarising the complex 
structure in statistical inference; secondly, to compare two different approaches to 
elementarisation. The difficulties in the concepts and the individual concept acquisition 
in stochastics in general and in statistical inference are well-known. That has induced the 
search for new learning forms; for elementarisation, the idea of visualisation and the New 
Technologies have been integrated into teaching very early. Computer-intensive methods 
of statistics have also served as incentive for didactic innovations.  
Informal inference may be used as a label for endeavours to simplify, visualise, or 
simulate the hypothetical model behind statistical inference. That means, the statistical 
model in the background is still the target of teaching and forms the background. That 
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implies that the theoretical character of such models is visualised by simpler means. The 
elementarisation is viewed as a transient stage to statistical inference. 
“Informal Inference” – going back to the computer-intensive methods in statistics such 
as Bootstrap and re-randomisation – is an educational approach that reduces statistical 
inference completely to the observed data developing the methods solely based on 
resampling this data. There are only natural null hypotheses of no effect that can be tested 
for significance, or intervals are calculated from artificially simulated data that mimic 
confidence intervals. 
We illustrate both approaches and present a detailed discussion about the relative merits 
and show how to build conceptual understanding by meta-knowledge based on 
simplifications of – the full complexity of – statistical inference.  
2. An elementary approach to the significance test 
We illustrate the way of thinking in a significance test in a very simple situation, which 
has also been used by R. A. Fisher in his early justification of the method. The task is: 
The efficacy of an antihypertensive drug should be corroborated by a placebo-controlled, 
randomised, double-blind clinical study. The target variable is: The intra-individual 
difference of blood pressure = systolic blood pressure at baseline minus the value after 4 
weeks of medication measured in mm Hg. The hypotheses at test: The null hypothesis 
(H0) states that Verum (the medication) is equally effective as Placebo (a fake medication 
that can neither be recognised as such by the patients nor by the medical doctor). The 
alternative hypothesis (H1) is that Verum is better than Placebo. 
2.1. Re-arrangement and ranks  
The basic ideas are illustrated by the Mann-Whitney test for independent samples. We 
use ranks rather than the measurements of the patients and a re-randomisation argument 
to read a p value for H0 off the data. After ordering and ranking the data (see Figure 1), 
we find – surprisingly – all the data from the Placebo group in the lowest ranks with a 
rank sum of 10 while the Verum group attains the maximum rank sum of 26.  
The null hypothesis states that there is no difference in the effect of Verum or Placebo so 
that we should be allowed to perceive any 4 of the 8 persons as the control group (Placebo) 
and the others as the Verum group. The advantage of the present way to tackle the 
problem is the following: The null hypothesis has the obvious implication that any of 
these ways to recruit a hypothetical control group has the same justification and thus the 
same probability. We only have to find all re-attributions of 4 persons from the 8 to a 
control group. There are 70)4,8(
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C . In Figure 2 (left), we order 
these possibilities by the rank sum (only a few to show the principle); in Figure 2 (right), 
we show the possibilities of the rank sum by a bar chart.  
Under the null hypothesis, the distribution in Figure 2 (right) represents the probability 
distribution of the rank sum. As the probability to get the extreme rank sum of 10 for the 
Placebo group is only 1/70, we get a p value for H0 of 2/70 = 0.0286 < 0.05 (if the test is 
applied two-sided, i.e., if a difference between the two groups could be either way). In 
the usual perception of significance testing, we can reject H0 at the 5% level. 
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Figure 1. Data and ordered data of the Placebo-Verum experiment 
 
 
Figure 2. Left: Possible rankings ordered by the rank sum –  
Right: Possibilities of each of the rank sum as probability distribution under H0 
2.2. The p value: Some initial concerns 
We have calculated the probability for an observed result if the null hypothesis H0 applies 
and use this so-called p value to judge the credibility of H0. If p is smaller than 5%, H0 is 
rejected; p is the probability for a false positive statement, i.e., the test yields a significant 
result if the drug is not effective: 
p = P(Test significant | Drug is not effective). 
We have observed something that has less probability than 5% if H0 applies (drug not 
effective). Yet, we are only interested in the following probability: 
P (Drug is effective | Test significant). 
But this number cannot be calculated from the givens! The conclusion about a clinical 
study is based on statistical methods. Doctors are no experts in statistics and need not be. 
Yet, they should know the principles of scientific methods. Neyman and Pearson (1933) 
clearly limit the scope of statistical tests. They state that “No test based upon a theory of 
probability can by itself provide any valuable evidence of the truth or falsehood of a 
hypothesis.” A dialogue between a doctor and a statistician illustrates the conflict: 
Do: You tried hard to explain the statistical test to me – but what does it mean if my test yields a 
significant result? May I claim that the drug is effective? 
St: No – You can only calculate how probable such a test result is IF the drug is not effective. 
Do: The ethics commission has approved this study to investigate the efficiency of this drug. I did 
ask you whether you can prove this by a statistical test. As the result now is significant, I thought, 
that the probability that my drug is effective is 95% – because the p value is 5%. 
St: You did ask me something to which the p value has no answer. The error probability for your 
statement is higher – yet, I cannot calculate it. 
Do: You may be right but I have done it as all do – why should this be wrong? The result of the 
statistical test is significant and will be published: The drug is effective (p < 0.05). 
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3. Informal inference – An analogy to the medical situation 
We explore the situation in medicine where there is always a decision that may lead to 
various errors whatever the decision is. A diagnostic test may be compared to a statistical 
test. This serves to understand statistical tests better. It may also serve to understand and 
investigate the medical decision better. 
3.1. Separating the distribution of a variable among healthy and ill people 
The other standard task in medicine is the diagnosis of a disease under scrutiny according 
to the outcome of a medical test, i.e., a biometric variable. We compare the task of 
separating two groups from each other by the values of a variable in the different settings 
(Figure 3): the diagnostic test, the clinical trial of a drug, the statistical test. 
Distribution for ill and healthy persons Separating the groups: Diagnostic Test 
 
  
Separating the groups: Statistical Test Clinical trials of drugs as Statistical Test 
  
Figure 3. Contexts for separating two groups: Medical diagnosis – Statistical test – 
Clinical trials: Different terminology for the same concepts 
For drug testing, a standard has emerged with magic figures: power (probability to detect 
an effect of the drug if there is one) should attain 80%, type-I (drug wrongly assumed to 
have an effect) should not be larger than 5%. 
3.2. Medical test as decision 
We extend the test in Section 2 to include the alternative hypothesis (shift in the mean of 
the variable under scrutiny) to allow for power considerations. The clinical trial, the 
diagnosis problem, or the quality control (Section 4.4), all bear the structure of a decision 
situation. A decision has to be made about H0 or H1 based on data. 
95 %
Reference region
healthy
ill
false
positive
correctly
negative
healthy
correctly
positive
ill
false
negative
Sensitivity
Specifity
– +
not significant significant
Drug has no effect
Drug is efficient
α Type I error
β Type II error Power
P( Test n.s. 
| Drug no effect)
P( Test sig | Drug no effect)
P( Test sig. | Drug efficient )P( Test n.s. | Drug efficient)
not significant significant
Drug has no effect
Drug has the effect
An effect of the drug is 
wrongly assumed
5%
Drug effect is not 
recognised
20%
Power 
80%
Manfred Borovcnik 
 
5       
 
 
Table 1. The clinical trial as decision-making situation with the different errors 1 
1 The order of H0 and H1 as well as the decisions is different from before! 
It is helpful to recognise that the structure of the decision problem and the potential errors 
remains the same in all three contexts. The analogy (Table 1) illustrates the meaning of 
the same concept in various contexts: 
p = P(Test + | Ill)  Sensitivity in the diagnosing context, 
p = P(Test significant | Drug effective)  Power in statistical tests. 
Missing is any information on the Positive or Negative Predictive Value (PPV or NPV):  
P(Ill | Test +), or P(Drug effective | Test significant) and 
P(Healthy | Test –), or P(Drug not effective | Test not significant). 
This probability describes the quality of the decision procedure. Not only that we do not 
know it, it is also dependent on the prevalence of the disease or the quality of research 
hypotheses (in drug testing as in statistical tests). We use data on mammography in 
radiologic clinic and in screening in Table 2, which shows the absolute numbers of the 
various combinations of disease and diagnosis. If we read the columns, we obtain 
sensitivity and specificity. The table allows also calculating the proportions in rows, 
which are the most interesting figures from above, namely the PPV and NPV. Strikingly, 
the PPV – the probability that a person has a carcinoma after a positive diagnosis – 
depends on the context and the prevalence of the disease under scrutiny (the same holds 
for NPV). 
Table 2. Expected values of status (carcinoma or no carcinoma) and  
diagnosis (positive or negative) in radiologic clinic and in screening 
Gigerenzer (2002) has advocated reformulating probabilities (sensitivity and specificity 
are usually known) by expected values, which he calls natural frequencies. They allow 
for a quick orientation on relevant probabilities (see Batanero & Borovcnik, 2016). 
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3.3. Cut points to separate the groups of healthy and ill 
We show the difficulty to separate between the groups of tumour patients and tumour-
free patients by introducing a cut point. The faecal occult blood test (FOBT) is used to 
detect colon cancer. We use data on 20 patients in each group (Figure 4). If we diagnose 
a patient as positive if the FOBT exceeds 75 and negative else, we see that in the tumour 
group three persons are falsely misclassified as negative, which amounts to a sensitivity 
of 17/20 = 85%. On the other hand, this cut point leads to two cases of false positive 
diagnosis in the tumour-free group, which corresponds to a specificity of 18/20 = 90%. 
 
Figure 4. The choice of the cut point leads to a separation of the two groups with 
distinct quality as measured by the concepts of sensitivity and specificity  
Which cut point should be used for diagnosis? If we vary the cut point, we generate 
several procedures for the diagnosis, all with different properties (Figure 5).  
         
                         
Figure 5. Cut points lead to different methods of diagnosis with a different point on the 
ROC curve – a point in the upper left corner reflects a good diagnosis  
It is customary, to illustrate the quality of the diagnosis by the so-called ROC curve, which 
shows to each cut point the corresponding point (, 1 – ), i.e., the type-I error on the 
first coordinate and the sensitivity on the second. That means a point far left and up is 
linked to a diagnosis with good properties to separate the two groups. 
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We recognise that the higher the cut point is chosen, the further to the left (good for the 
diagnosis) and the further down (bad for the diagnosis) the corresponding point on the 
ROC curve will lie. We are faced with antagonistic consequences when shifting the cut 
point. We have to find a compromise between the two targets to get a small type-I error 
and a high power. Various diseases have different distributions for the target variable and 
correspond to different ROC curves. The disease with the dotted (blue) distribution, 
which is the same as the distribution among healthy people, turns the diagnosis to a coin 
tossing experiment, i.e., simple guessing. The corresponding ROC is the diagonal, all 
points of which are far off the upper left corner that hosts the points for diagnosing 
procedures with good properties. 
         
Figure 6. The closer the distributions of ill and healthy the more difficult the diagnosis  
3.4. Some conclusions from the analogy to medicine 
From the analogy to medicine, we learn that we normally face a decision problem, which 
may be described – for simplification – by two scenarios. Diagnosing for diseases is a 
decision problem, which compares distributions under the scenario of healthy and ill 
people. Whatever we decide, we are prone to committing an error. There are always – at 
least – two diverging errors in the play: 
 Diagnose for the disease when the person is healthy. 
 Not recognise the disease despite the fact that the person has it. 
Wherever we introduce the cut point between the two groups (scenarios), the errors are 
influenced by that choice and we should orientate ourselves on their magnitude. Several 
cut points for separating healthy and ill imply different sizes of these errors. There are 
diseases that are easy to diagnose. Reducing the complexity of the decision situation, the 
p value is used but it not easy to interpret this number in a practical meaningful way. 
There is a third error: Whether the decision is a good one, does not only depend on cut 
points but also on the prevalence of the disease. In summarising, we do not get well 
interpretable coefficients for the quality of decisions in many cases. 
4. Informal ways towards statistical inference 
We illustrate various informal ways to explore key statistical concepts. One main problem 
is to highlight the relevance and the meaning of the sampling distribution of statistics that 
estimate a parameter of the population. Another idea is to reduce the complexity of 
statistical tests to a comparison of two distributions that makes sense in the context so 
that decisions and their implications become a natural issue to discuss just as in the 
analogy to the medical situation (of diagnosing or testing drugs). The explorations serve 
to learn about key features, also by establishing meta-knowledge about the method 
beyond mathematics. The goal is to reduce the complexity of the situation but keep the 
path to the general situation open. 
ill
healthy
1-  = Sensitivity
 = 1 - Specifity
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4.1. Two different methods of estimating the mean 
The values of the population are marked by a bar (see Figure 7). Two homogenous strata 
are visible. If such a case of strata is known, it is advisable to consider that in sampling. 
We compare two methods: Method 1: Random sample of 6 elements from all neglecting 
the strata; Method 2: Random sample of 2 from stratum 1 and 4 from stratum 2. For both 
methods, we can see from the simulation scenario (Figure 7) that the mean of simulated 
data is roughly equal to the mean of the population (unbiased estimator). We see also that 
strata sampling (Method 2) delivers much more precise results. The improvement of the 
estimate by sampling from the strata as compared to sampling neglecting the strata is 
stable in the repetition of the scenario. 
 
Figure 7. Sampling unrestricted and from strata – sampling distribution of the mean 
One can visualise the persons who are sampled and their data and show – like in a video 
– how these change by renewing the sample to get an impression about the variability of 
sampling and the changing error in estimating the mean of the population by the mean of 
the sample. It will get immediately clear that Method 2 (stratified sampling) leads to 
smaller errors in general. It is important to see how single samples behave before 
summarising the result of many samples by the sampling distribution of the mean. This 
is important as in practice we have only one (!) sample. The result of this sampling process 
(with 1000 samples and their mean each) is shown in Figure 7: What has been an 
impression is now corroborated by the simulation scenario. By Method 1 (unrestricted 
sampling), the error is in general very large with means between 2 and 12 while for 
Method 2 (strata sampling) the error tends to be small with means between 7.5 and 9.5. 
4.2. The sampling distribution of the mean is an artificial distribution 
In the statistical laboratory, we can simulate samples from any population. The sampling 
distribution of the estimate of any parameter shows how the parameter estimation varies 
from one sample to another. Usually, we have only one sample and therefore it seems 
contra-intuitive to speak of the variation of the estimate. Yet, in a thought experiment, we 
can repeat the sample very often to illustrate the properties of the estimation. Are we 
lucky in one sample to have an estimate that is close to the pertaining parameter of the 
population, or may we rely on the fact that the general risk of getting large deviations 
from the parameter of the population is small? 
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We can simulate two completely different populations – one with a uniform and one with 
a J-shaped distribution on the population to highlight the concept of sampling distribution 
and to illustrate its key features (see Figure 8). Regardless of the parent population, the 
sampling distribution of the mean (as of many other parameters) restricts to the point of 
the mean of the population (the parameter of interest) and resembles more and more in 
shape to a normal distribution with increasing sample size. See also Batanero and 
Borovcnik (2016) for a scenario to show these properties of the sampling distribution of 
the mean; Figure 8 illustrates the development from 5 to 20 samples. Note that for the 
mean, the width of the distribution (as measured by the standard error) halves if we take 
a sample 4 times as large as before. It is instructive to see that the shape of the sampling 
distribution is nearly invariant with the repetition. 
 Uniform population J-shaped population 
Population 
  
Mean of samples  
with 5 data 
  
Mean of samples  
with 20 data 
  
Figure 8. Sampling distribution of the mean of a sample from  
a uniform (left) and a J-shaped population (right) 
4.3. Measuring an unknown probability as path to the Law of Large Numbers 
In the following (coin-tossing) experiment, the relative frequencies are investigated along 
an idea expressed in Batanero and Borovcnik (2016). Rather than showing how the 
relative frequencies converge (what should that mean and to where they should 
converge?), a task of estimating the unknown probability is posed. The estimation may 
be based on samples (blocks) of 5 trials (5 tosses of the coin) or 10 or 20. We show in 
Figure 9 how the relative frequencies converge with the number of trials and we observe 
the development until 1000 trials are performed. The current series (in Figure 9) cannot 
fluctuate much because of the past 1000 values. The curve suggests a great precision of 
less than 0.5 percentage points of fluctuation. Yet, a new experiment shows – like in a 
video – another curve with another “limiting point” within +/– 3 % points; a repetition of 
the series of 1000 trials will also “converge” yet to a different point.  
The Law of Large Numbers states that the theoretical (not the empirical) relative 
frequencies “converge” to the unknown probability. This “convergence” in a real 
experiment hides that current results are still prone to randomness. What about changing 
the task and measuring the unknown probability by short series and investigate the 
precision of such a measurement. After each block of 5 (10, or 20), the sample is 
summarised and used to estimate the unknown probability. The estimates may be 0.0, 0.2, 
…, 0.8, and 1.0 (according to 0, 1, …, 5 Heads). In Figure 9 (left), we see how these 
estimates fluctuate; many are beyond the dashed (red) lines with an estimation error larger 
than 0.2. Of course, the sample is very small, the error should be large.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mean
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mean
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mean
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mean
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mean
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mean
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Figure 9. Measuring an unknown probability – Investigation of the precision 
   
Figure 10. Distribution of the repeated measurements 
In the middle diagram of Figure 9, the results of measuring the probability by samples of 
10 is shown and the estimate fluctuates much less; even smaller is the variation of the 
estimate (and the errors are smaller) in the right diagram of Figure 9, which shows the 
estimates of the probability based on samples of 20. We see only two estimates beyond 
the dashed (red) lines. By a thought experiment, one may conclude that the precision of 
the estimate improves the larger the sample and its distribution will restrict to the 
(unknown) probability. This constriction of the distribution of the estimates, which is 
represented in Figure 10, may also be seen from the study of the sampling distribution of 
the mean (in Figure 8). The risk of committing an error larger than 0.2, is decreasing with 
the size of the series (sample) on which the measurement is based on. 
4.4. How to separate good and bad quality – Informal exercises in statistical tests 
The following example goes back to Batanero and Borovcnik (2016). The task is to judge 
whether the current production (or a lot that has come in) has a good or bad quality. Single 
items can show only this property, which is encoded by 0 (good) and 1 (defective). By 
inspecting a sample of n items, a decision should be made about the quality. The number 
of defectives in the sample is hyper-geometrically distributed; neglecting that sampling 
is without replacement, we can use the binomial distribution instead. Two scenarios are 
compared, which stand for different stakeholders: a lot has come into the consumer’s 
factory, sent from the producer; good quality is represented by p = 0.04, bad quality by p 
= 0.10 (p stands for proportion of defectives).  
Rather than using the binomial distribution, we have simulated 5000 samples of size n = 
100 and determined the relative frequency from the simulation scenario in order to 
estimate the probabilities. In Figure 11, we show the implication of a rejection number, 
let us say, reject the lot as bad (reject the null hypothesis of good quality) in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis. One may change the rejection number (shift the dashed bar in the 
diagram) and it becomes visible how the two types of error change and recognise that 
they are antagonistic, i.e., while the one gets smaller, the other gets larger.  
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Figure 11. A rejection number (vertical dashed line) is associated with two types of 
errors: the decision is based on a sample with n = 100 (left) and n = 400 (right) 
On the right side of Figure 11, we see the consequences of a larger sample for the decision. 
With 400 data, both errors become small. The choice of the rejection number balances 
the diverging interests of vendor and buyer. The diagram (Figure 11) with the threshold 
above which the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative reminds us to the 
diagrams from Section 3 in medical diagnosis. Basically, it is the same type of decision 
situation. Being above the rejection number corresponds to being above the cut point; the 
ensuing decision is that the lot has a bad quality, which corresponds to the positive 
diagnosis (the patient is classified to have the disease under scrutiny). 
We have many other tasks, in which we do not have to separate two or more groups from 
each other but to study the consequences of scenarios for different groups. For example, 
the case of single-choice exam papers. While the assumptions for a binomial distribution 
for the number of correctly solved items by merely guessing are undisputed, the 
assumptions are not really appropriate to describe someone who has learned. Yet, the 
scenarios may be played through with valuable insights into the way how such test papers 
have to be designed in order to keep the risk small that someone passes the exam who is 
merely guessing and – at the same time – to ensure that the risk gets small to fail in the 
exam for someone who has learned and has a solving capacity of 0.55 or even 0.80. More 
can be seen from Borovcnik (n.d.). Another prototype of tasks originates from statistical 
process control where the hourly inspection for the quality of the measurements should 
orientate about the present calibration of the production machine with a built-in alarm in 
case that the calibration has shifted. For details, see Borovcnik (n.d.). 
5. “Informal inference” 
Informal inference centres all considerations about generalising the information 
contained in a given data set solely on this data. Early steps of development of the 
informal approach are the following: Resampling as a didactical technique (Borovcnik, 
1996), as a transient stage to statistical inference (Borovcnik, 2006a, b); as method to 
replace statistical inference (Cobb, 2007); re-randomisation tests as replacement for the 
significance test (Rossman, 2008); Bootstrap intervals to replace confidence intervals 
(Engel, 2010). Stohl Lee, Angotti, & Tarr (2010) present a panoramic approach by 
examples. The methods are explained below; more about the methodology may be 
consulted from Lunneborg (2000); for extensive critique of the approach, see Howell 
(n.d.). 
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5.1. Introduction to the “informal inference” approach 
Estimation  Bootstrap is used to estimate the standard error. Instead of sampling from a 
true distribution function F, the estimate of F from the initial sample is sampled (with 
replacement). Bootstrap yields approximate intervals for the unknown parameter. 
Hypothesis testing  This is reduced to randomisation tests. Re-randomisation of 
assignment to groups to be compared provides artificial data that are used for the test. 
Either all permutations of the data are investigated, or sampling is from the data with no 
replacement, which is equivalent to sampling all permutations. This approach provides 
exact nonparametric tests in specific cases. 
The case of the natural null hypothesis  The intention of “Informal Inference” is to embed 
the complex situation in statistical inference in a natural, material setting (i.e., the data) 
leaving out any consideration about hypotheses except the natural null hypothesis (see 
Section 5.3) of pure random effects on the statistical units. 
Inference about one “group”  If one data set is to be judged, e.g., for a measure of 
location, a Bootstrap interval is obtained by repeatedly sampling from the given data 
(always calculating this statistical measure). This resampling provides an empirical basis 
(an empirical distribution) for the statistical measure. If a (hypothesised) parameter value 
falls outside the Bootstrap interval, then it is “rejected”.  
Inference about two groups  If two given data sets are to be compared for a measure of 
location (or any other parameter), then there are two options: First, we can resample from 
the given data on each group to derive the Bootstrap interval for this parameter. Second 
(and much more intuitive), we can re-randomise the attribution of single data to one of 
the groups by a random decision. If the null hypothesis of no difference between the two 
groups applies, then the data can be pooled and from this pool, the data for group 1 (and 
2) can be randomly selected so that again an empirical basis of the statistic of interest can 
be generated solely by the given data. The initial random attribution is randomly redone 
on the existing data, which reflects the natural null effect hypothesis. 
5.2. Bootstrap interval and classical confidence interval for the mean 
Given: A sample of size n with mean and SD for a specific variable (data below in Figure 
12). How precise is the mean of the sample as a measurement for the population? The 
variable Time = time worked for a seminar.  
Rather than sampling again from the population, which is impossible, we sample from 
the first sample (with replacement). The first Bootstrap yields a new measurement of the 
mean of the population, which differs not too much from the mean of the original sample. 
We repeat the Bootstrap and get 1000 (or more) artificial measurements.  
The artificial data obtained by this method reflect the variability of repeated 
measurements of the unknown mean of the population. From the Bootstrap distribution 
for the mean, we can easily cut off the lowest and highest 2.5% of the Bootstrapped means 
in order to get the 95% Bootstrap interval, which yields (3.60, 15.70) in our simulation 
scenario. This may be compared to the classical confidence interval of (2.46, 15.34). We 
see a good match of both methods. Yet, the interpretation differs. The Bootstrap interval 
reflects the precision of repeated measurements of the mean of the population while the 
confidence interval contains the mean of the population in 95% of “repeated” samples. 
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Figure 12. Left: Original sample of the time worked on a seminar and first Bootstrap 
sample from this data – Right: Histogram of 1000 Bootstrap samples 
The Bootstrap may be applied to estimate other parameters of the distribution. The 
procedure is analogue to that with the mean. Estimate the relevant parameter from the 
original sample, Bootstrap the first sample (by sampling with replacement) and calculate 
the parameter of the resampled sample in order to get artificial data about the parameter 
of interest and analyse the Bootstrap distribution of this parameter. Cut off the upper and 
lower end of this distribution to get a Bootstrap interval. One may also determine a 
Bootstrap interval for the correlation of two samples in this way. 
5.3. Re-randomisation test for the difference in means 
Is treatment effective (with respect to a target variable)? Treatment group (TG) gets 
Verum – control group (CG) gets Placebo. Re-randomisation offers an alternative to the 
two-sample t test. The procedure is similar to the significance test in Section 2. Rather 
than dealing with ranks of observations, we analyse the values of the data here. Rather 
than determining all possibilities of various rank sums, we simulate from the distribution 
of all possibilities. 
Under the null hypothesis of NO DIFF, it is intuitive that any re-arrangement of persons 
to treatments should have NO EFFECT. We therefore permute the persons and the next 
treatment group consists of 6, 5, 11, 7, 10, and 8. The first re-attribution yields a new 
measurement of the difference of the means (as measuring the effect of treatment); the 
difference between treatment and control group in the original sample is 33.58 while the 
first re-attribution yields a difference of –17.25 (see Figure 13).  
The distribution for the repeated re-randomisation is shown in Figure 13 (right); it yields 
the artificial results based on the hypothesis of NO DIFFERENCE, i.e., the null 
hypothesis. We can fit the result of the first sample into this distribution and see that the 
p value of it is 6.6% (two-sided). The whole simulation scenario may be repeated to show 
that the result is stable. Again, we can compare this re-attribution result to the classical 
two-sample t test, which yields 2.16 with a p value of 5.6% or 2.16 with 5.9% (depending 
on the additional assumption of equal or unequal variances).  
Again, the similarity of the classical results to the re-attribution test is striking. The 
procedure can be applied to other comparisons as well; for example, the correlation task 
may be rephrased as a test of the hypothesis that the correlation in the population is zero. 
See Borovcnik (n.d.) for details. 
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Figure 13. Left: Original sample of the target variable in treatment & control group and 
first re-attribution of persons to treatment – Right: Histogram of 1000 re-attributions  
5.4. “Informal inference” contrasted to key statistical notions 
“Informal inference” is not inference in a mathematical sense. It is NOT an informal 
approach to what the discipline of statistics calls inference. It presents a rather restricted 
approach to making inferences with no obvious links how to proceed from there to formal 
inference (unless one omits traditional statistical inference).  
Within “Informal Inference” it is impossible to address key concepts.  In Table 3 
(Borovcnik, 2017), Bootstrap and Re-randomisation are compared to key statistical ideas 
to highlight the deficits if taken as the sole approach towards statistical inference. 
Table 3. “Informal” inference and key statistical ideas 
Statistical inference implies a hypothetical approach. There have been several 
endeavours to compare the various schools of inference starting from Barnett (1982). 
They differ according to which hypotheses are included and how they are treated. 
 Alternative hypotheses. There is no way to introduce alternative hypotheses except 
by probabilistic assumptions and by simulation (or probability calculations). Any 
alternative cannot be resampled as is has not been sampled. The data are not suitable 
for investigating alternative hypotheses by resampling. 
 Hypothetical comparison of models. Modelling involves comparing scenarios 
(described by probability distributions) and not only judging a single one. 
Hypothesis tests are comparisons of models (while the model family is restricted).  
Resampling marks a change from probability models to data; it causes a shift in 
connotation from hypotheses to facts (data as facts); models are absorbed in (resampled) 
data. Yet, how judgement of hypotheses is done, lies at the core of statistical inference. 
Whether it is done by classical or Bayesian methods, there is no link from resampling. 
 
 
Concepts  Re-randomisation Bootstrap 
Hypotheses – scenarios Only NULL effect hypothesis Not possible to conceptualise 
Type I (or ) error Yes No 
Type II (or ) error No No 
Alternative hypotheses  Not possible to conceptualise Not possible to conceptualise 
Methods Only significance test of NULL effect No link to significance tests 
Nr E Random Nr E
1 69,0 0,48 6 40,0
2 24,0 0,74 5 77,5
3 63,0 0,17 11 -7,5
4 87,5 0,39 7 9,0
5 77,5 0,26 10 77,5
6 40,0 0,36 8 12,0
7 9,0 0,78 4 87,5
8 12,0 0,36 9 36,0
9 36,0 0,99 1 69,0
10 77,5 0,98 2 24,0
11 -7,5 0,16 12 32,5
12 32,5 0,81 3 63,0
TG 60,17 TG 34,75
CG 26,58 CG 52,00
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Resampling reduces probability to the frequentist conception.  As statistical inference is 
reduced to resampling the data, there is no obvious link for other connotations of 
probability though they are relevant for the various schools of inference (see Barnett, 
1982). This narrows also the connection to decision theory. Many problems of statistical 
inference are enhanced if seen from a decision-theoretic perspective. 
The case of small probabilities.  In Bootstrap, a new error is introduced. If it is about the 
tails of a distribution (small probabilities), one would not get data about them so that the 
tails will not be resampled. If the first sample is not big enough, more regions of the 
distribution cannot be sampled well. If the first sample is big, then anyway the Central 
Limit Theorem delivers better results. If one resamples, then the additional variation is 
big unless one generates more than 10,000 re-samples. That makes it intractable for 
teaching. Simulation is misplaced for the problem of small probabilities; a problem, 
which is underestimated in statistics education (see Batanero & Borovcnik, 2016). 
6. Educational concerns about resampling and conclusions 
“Informal Inference” has been suggested as a way to revolutionise teaching statistical 
inference (Cobb, 2007; delMas, 2017; Ben-Zvi, Makar, & Garfield, 2018). Yet, there are 
issues to re-consider not only from an educational point of view. 
Re-randomisation is null hypothesis significance testing.  It deals with testing a null effect 
hypothesis. The difference in the mean, e.g., between two populations is compared by a 
random re-arrangement of the units to one of the groups. A distribution for the difference 
of means is generated, which corresponds to the null hypothesis of no difference between 
groups. A re-arrangement of the given data cannot be performed to reflect specific 
differences between the two groups so that the method fails to incorporate issues of errors 
of type II. We are stuck with a pure significance test with all the confusion that arises 
from the p value (see, e.g., Hubbard & Bayarri, 2003). 
Confusion of Bootstrap and confidence intervals.  Bootstrap intervals are not easy to 
implement when corrections are applied to adapt their coverage probability (for the 
sophisticated corrections, see Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). Bootstrap intervals are not easy 
to connect to traditional topics further on. Often, the specification “Bootstrap” is omitted. 
The same terms for widely different concepts may confuse learners.  
Simplifying the approach to a discipline for didactical purpose.  Brousseau (1984) warns 
of the implications of elementarisation in didactical considerations. In simplifying, one 
finally might end up with teaching a new object that does not even exist in mathematics 
(“glissement methadidactique”). Biehler (2014) states that: “[…] formal inferential 
reasoning as such is controversial itself […] This raises questions with regard to which 
view of formal […] inference we design […] informal inference activities for.” “Informal 
Inference” goes beyond informally exploring probabilistic models; it aims to replace 
traditional statistical inference. The advantages of an intuitive approach towards inference 
get lost if it is not seen as a transient stage in teaching and learning. 
Issues to re-consider for an” Informal Inference” approach: 
 “Informal Inference” is very convincing but leads to a restricted methodology that 
is a strict subset of statistical inference.  
 Bootstrap intervals differ from classical confidence intervals; to adapt them, 
requires sophisticated methods so that their intuitive advantage is lost (see Efron & 
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Tibshirani, 1993, Lunneborg, 2000, or Howell, n.d.). Re-randomisation does not 
permit errors of type II so that testing is reduced to the disputed significance test. 
 Bootstrap fails with small (tail) probabilities, which are not covered in the data 
unless the sample is very large so that one cannot resample them. It is a matter of 
modelling small probabilities and risks rather than only dealing smartly with data.  
 The “Informal Inference” approach unfeasibly reduces the conception of 
probability to the frequency aspect as inference is reduced to resampling and 
relative frequencies of artificial data. Here, we face the dilemma formulated by 
Carranza and Kuzniak (2008) with a pure frequentist approach to stochastics where 
the applied problems require a decision-theoretic approach and a qualitative 
(subjectivist) connotation of probability. 
 How to adapt the probability curriculum? Should we leave the normal distribution 
behind? Probabilistic modelling uses many other distributions (e.g., for risk 
analysis). How to deal with other approaches and interpretations (e.g., Bayes). 
 How to continue the curriculum within such a setting? There is no path from 
resampling to decision theory, which is much closer to many problems of everyday 
concern but also to many applications such as in medicine or economy. There is no 
connection from resampling to Bayes methods (though Bayesians use simulation a 
lot), which form a relevant approach for problems from real world. 
 Conceptual understanding differs from easier access and solving of tasks. 
Furthermore, modelling is absorbed in simulation. This may result in data as facts 
while models represent a hypothetical way of thinking. It might be better to teach 
classical and Bayesian inference in parallel to highlight the differences in the 
concepts and thus allow for a sustainable concept acquisition (see Vancsó, 2009). 
“Informal Inference” narrows the view on probabilistic modelling later. General 
educational questions that arise with the approach are: The statisticians use ever more 
sophisticated models but we have not even managed to teach the simplest. How will 
anyone be able to challenge the experts if educated only on this side-track? Should 
statistics for secondary level be a field that has nearly nothing in common with statistics 
at university and the abundant applications that intrude every sector of public and private 
life? Are we going to distract people from critically appraising and challenging those 
applications of statistics? We suggest using resampling (Bootstrap and re-randomisation) 
as a transient stage to statistical inference and focus on ways of elementarising the full 
complexity of statistical inference.  
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